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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: In this legal malpractice case, plaintifUappellant Mary Killins Soignier 
alleges that as a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant attorney, she has been denied 
her testamentaly entitlement as a named beneficiary in the decedent's Will. Specifically, defendant 
attorney drafted a will which purportedly bequeathed to plaintiff certain trust assets. Defendant 
attorney failed to check into the status of the trust. Upon the testator's death, it was determined that 
the trust had auton~atically terminated two months before the Will was drafted, and the testator 
owned the trust assets outright. Because testator's estate held no interest in any trust, the probate 
court determined that plaintiffwas entitled to nothing and that the residuary beneficiary was entitled 
to assets which had previously been in trust. 
Course of ~ r o c e e d i n ~ s  below: Pleadings: The complaint filed in this matter alleged, in part, 
as follows: 
v 
In drafting decedent Cowan's last will and testament (Exhibit 2), 
defendant Fletcher negligently failed to ascertain that decedent 
Cowan held no interests in trusts and the last interest held was in the 
Leonarda Cowan trust which interest terminated as early as 
November 7, 2003 (the decedent's fiftieth birthday) or as late as 
March 4,2005 (the Final Rclease and Discharge of the trustee), two 
months earlier. That is, defendant Fletcher drafted a will (Exhibit 2) 
in which decedent's bequest to plaintiff Soignier, i.e., "beneficial 
interest in trusts", would be frustrated because the Leonarda Cowan 
Trust had been terminated prior to decedent's execution of the will. 
Further, defendant Fletcher negligently failed to advise decedent 
Cowan that upon his death there were no trust interests, as such, to be 
conveyed and that Cowan's testamentary intent vis-a-vis plaintiff 
Soignier, as set forth in the will authored by Fletcher, would be 
frustrated. 
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R. pp. 14, 15. 
The complaint then alleges that, as a proximate result of the alleged negligence, the probate 
court iuled that, absent any trust interests in the Cowan estate, the estate assets should go to the 
residuary beneficiary, the American Cancer Society. 
Defendant Fletcher answered the complaint, denying the material allegations, including the 
allegation that he breached a duty owed to plaintiff. (R. pp. 66-71). 
Defendant's motion for summarv judgment: Within thirty days of filing his answer, 
defendant Fletcher filed a motioil for summiuyjudgmellt on the following grounds: (I) the complaiilt 
is untimely under the applicable statute of limitations (Idaho Code §5-219(4)); (2) the defendant 
attorney owed no duty of care to the plaintiff; (3) the complaint is barred by the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel; and (4) the complaint is barred under the doctrines of waiver and quasi-estoppel. (K. pp. 
75-89). 
Defendant's motion was accompanied by the affidavit of defendant Fletcher which presented 
as exhibits the Cowan Will (R. pp. 95-97) and plaintiffs settlement agreement with the Estate (R. 
pp. 98,99j. Mr. Fletcher did not opine with respect to the standard of care but did attribute certain 
statements to the testator Cowan (R. p. 91). 
Plaintiff's o~posit ion to the motion: Plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment may be summarized as follows: (I) the two year statute of limitations was not triggered 
until the probate court ruled that plaintiff Killins Soingier would taking nothing by the Will; (2) 
under Idaho common law, an attorney owes a duty of care to a named beneficiary; (3) plailltiffs 
settlement with the Cowan Estate was not taking a position inconsistent with the allegations of the 
complaint; therefore, judicial estoppel is not applicable; and (4) likewise, by settlement with the 
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Estate, plaintiff did not gain an unconscionable advantage over the defendant. The doctrines of 
quasi-estoppel and waiver are not applicable (R. pp. 108-125) 
Accompanying plaintiffs opposition brief was the affidavit ofAllen R.  Ellis which presented 
three exhibits: ( I )  the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust document (R. pp. 135-1 63); (2) a draft of an earlier 
Will of the testator (R. pp. 164-167); and the decision of the probate court awarding the Cowan 
Estate to the American Cancer Society (A.R., pp. 1-13). Also, plaintiffs affidavit was submitted to 
the effect that she received no consideration from defendant in dismissing her claim against the 
Estate (R. pp. 131, 132). Finally, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of John Magnuson, an Idaho 
attorney, to the effect that the conduct of defendant Fletcher in preparing the Cowan Will did not 
conform to the applicable standard of care (R. pp. 126-130). 
Plaintiff's motion to strike portions of the Fletcher affidavit: This motion sought to strike 
those portions of the Fletcher affidavit which attribute certain statements to the testator Zachary 
Cowan. This motion was based upon grounds of relevancy, absence of ambiguity in the Will, and 
Idaho common law (R., pp. 200-202). 
Defendant's replv brief: Defendant filed a reply brief and addressed those same issues 
raised in his initial brief (R. pp. 168-182). 
Entw of summary iudrtment: After taking oral argument, the district court, in a written 
opinion, ruled that defendant Fletcher did not breach any duties owed to plaintiff Soignier: 
[Tlhat there was an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Fletcher 
and Ms. Soignier that arose from Mr. Fletcher's preparation of 
Zachary Cowa~l's Will in which Ms. Soignier was named as a 
beneficiary". Mr. Fletcher owed Ms. Soignier a duty as a result of 
this relationship . . . The court determines that the relevant 
material facts do not establish that Mr. Fletcher breached the 
professional duty he owed to Ms. Soignier . . . The relevant 
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undisputed facts before the court do not establish a genuine dispute 
that the Will that Mr. Fletcher prepared in any way frustratedZachary 
Cowan's intent, as Mr. Cowan's intent was expressed in the Will. 
R. pp. 21 1,212, citing Hayrigfield v.  anc cock; 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2003). 
The district court ruled it was not necessary to rule upon the motion to strike the Fletcher 
affidavit because his decision was not based upon any material contained in that affidavit. 
Memorandum of costs and attornev fees: Citing the language of the district court in 
Bmton v. City ofMcCal1, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), defendant argued that attorney fees 
are awardable to the prevailing party under Idaho Code $12-120(3) in all malpractice cases, 
irrespective of their commercial underpinnings or lack thereof. 
Plaintiff's opposition to the claim for attorney fees: Plaintiff argued that, because an 
attorneyiclient relationship never existed between the plaintiff and defendant, attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code $12-120(3) are not appropriate in this case, even assuming defendant's reading of 
Bmton v. City of McCall is correct. Alternatively, because the underlying matter in this case was 
a probate matter, not a commercial matter, Idaho Code $ 12- 120(3) has no application. 
District Court's award of attornev fees: Citing Idaho Code $12-120(3), the district court 
awarded attorney fees to the defendant as the prevailing party. The Court reasoned that there was 
a contractualico~nn~ercial relationship between Mr. Cowan and defendant Fletcher, i.e., an 
attorneyiclient relationship. Plaintiff was a "third party beneficiary" to this contract, ergo the 
applicability of Idaho Code $12-120(3) (R. pp. 288,289). 
Now this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Will, which was drafled by defendant attorney Fletcher for the testator Zachary Cowan, 
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provided, Inter alia: "All beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to 
Mary Killings (sic). I exercise any power of appointment that I might hold and appoint Mary 
Killings (sic)" (R. p. 97). 
The trust referenced in the Will is the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust (R. pp. 135-163). This fact 
is set fort11 in the decision of the probate court (A.R., p. 2). There are two notable provisions in the 
Trust. 
First, there was a provision in the Trust that, when Zachary Cowan reaches the age of fifty 
years, the Trust would terminate and 70% of the trust assets would be distributed to Mr. Cowan 
"outright and free of trust". See Trust, paragraph 4.2(d)(ii) (R. pp. 142, 143). At the time attorney 
Fletcher drafted the 2005 Will Mr. Cowan was past his fiftieth birthday and the trust had terminated, 
i.e., Mr. Cowan was the owner of assets which had previously been trust assets (R. p. 207) 
Secondly, notwithstanding the provision in the Will, the subject Trust did not extend a power 
of appointment to the testator Cowan; rather, in the event he expired before the age of fifty, the Trust 
assets would go to Leonarda A. Cowan's niece, Sandra Eileen Keller. See Trust, paragraph 4.2(d)(I) 
(R., p. 142). At the time the Will was drafted, Mr. Cowan had already reached the age of fifty, 
assuring his outright ownership of the Trust assets. However, a fair inference to be drawn from the 
Will's reference to "power of appointment" is that defendant Fletcher failed to review the Trust 
document or did so imperfectly. 
The sequence of relevant events is as follows: 
Date 
Termination of trust March 4,2005 
Execution of Will May 24,2005 
Death of Mr. Cowan October 20,2006 
Probate court decision Se~tember 18,2007 
A.R., p. 6 
R. pp. 95-97 
R. p. 91 
A.R., p. 1-13 
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Because no trusts were in existence at the time of Mr. Cowan's death, the probate court, on 
September 17, 2007, ruled that the entirety of the Cowan estate, including those assets which had 
previously been in the Leonarda A Cowan Trust, should pass to the residuary beneficiary, the 
American Cancer Society, rather than plaintiff Killins Soignier: 
Mr. Cowan signed a "Final Release and Discharge" agreement on 
March 4, 2005. His beneficial interest share in the corpus of The 
Leonarda A. Cowan Trust was delivered over to him. The Trust was 
terminated. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any 
interest in any trusts. 
A.R., p. 6 
And the probate court further ruled: 
It is clear the testator intended to leave the residue and remainder of 
his property to the American Cancer Society and any beneficial trust 
interests to Mary Killins Soignier. 
The fact that the testator did not have an interest in any trust at the 
time of his death does not create a conflict with his intent towards the 
American Cancer Society. His stated intent towards each beneficiary 
is clear, and his stated intent regarding Ms. Soignier does not come 
into direct conflict with any other portion of the Will. Therefore, this 
Court concludes that Ms. Soignier has failed to demonstrate the Will 
contains a latent ambiguity. 
A.R. p. 11-12 
Plaintiffalleges that defendant Fletcher negligently failed to confirm the status ofthe testator's 
trust interests, thereby frustrating the testator's expressed intent that the assets which had been held 
in trust were to pass to plaintiff as the named beneficiary. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. In drafting the testator's Will, whether defendant attorney, as a matter of law, did not 
bleach his duty of care to plaintiff, a named beneficiary. 
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to the plaintiff, a named beneficiary in the Will. 
2. Whether the issue of defendant's negligence presents a genuine issue of material fact 
not amenable to summary adjudication under Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. 
3. Whether, in this legal malpractice case, the district court acted against the law in 
awarding attorney fees to defendant. 
4. In the event the plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter upon remand, whether 
she is entitied to attorney fees in prosecuting this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of review: (1) Entrv of sun~~narv iudanent: When reviewing adistrict court's grant 
of summary judgment, the Idaho appellate courts use the same standard a district court uses when it 
rules on a summary judgment motion. Jordan v. Beeb,  135 Idaho 586,589,21 P.3d 908,911 (2001). 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, su~nmaryjudgment shall be rendered when "the pleadings, 
depositions, and ad~nissions on file, together with the &davits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Rule 56(c) I.R.C.P. "All facts and inferences are to be construed most favorably toward the party 
against whom judgment is sought . . ." Spur Products v. Stoel Rives, 143 Idaho 8 12,815,153 P.3d 
1 158 (2007). 
(2) Award of attorney fees in district court: This issue involves the interpretation and 
application of Idaho Code $12-120(3). Determining a statute's meaning constitutes a matter of law 
over which Idaho appellate courts exercise free review. Rahas v. Vev Met,, 14 1 Idaho 4 12,4 15, 1 1 1 
P.3d 97 (2005). 
(3) Award of attorney fees on appeal: This issue also involves the interpretation and application 
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application of Idaho Code $12-120(3). 'This is a matter of law over which appellate courts exercise 
free review. Rahus v. Ver Met, supra. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ATTORNEY 
Correctness of underiyinp probate decision: Under the principles ofconstruction applicable 
to wills, the probate court made a correct decision in finding that, absent the existence of a trust, 
plaintiff should take nothing under the Will given its clear language: 
Therefore, a testator's intent is clear and una~nbiguous if the intent 
can be determined from the four comers of the document . . . 
It is clear the testator intended to leave the residue and remainder of 
his property to the American Cancer Society and any beneficial 
trust interests to Mary Killins Soignier. 
A.R. p. 1 1.  
Idaho law is unanimous that, where the language of a testamentary instrument is 
"unambiguous, given its ordina~y and well-understood meaning", the courts will not look beyond the 
four corners of the document. Hedrick v. West One Bank, 123 Idaho 803, 806, 853 P.2d 548, 
111 the context of attorney malpractice, the mere clarity of a testamentarv instrument -- 
should not serve to insulate the will drafter from liability: As this Court held in Harrigfeld v. 
If, as a proximate result of the attorney's professional negligence, the 
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments' is 
frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary's interest in the state 
is either lost, diminished or unrealized, the attorney would be liable to 
the beneficiary named. 
Id, 140 Idaho at 183,90 P.3d at 888. 
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It is a fair reading of the Will that the testator wished the plaintiff to receive certain assets 
which had been held in trust but which trust had recently terminated, giving the testator "outright" 
ownership. By inis-describing the assets as "beneficial interests in trusts", the defendant thwarted the 
testator's intent as to plaintiff's receipt of these assets. While the principles of will construction 
preclude going beyond a will's unambiguous Language, the plaintiff here, as a malpractice claimant, 
is not precluded from referencing the now-terminated trust, the terms of that trust, and the fact that 
defendant attorney failed to review it or did so cursorily. This latter omission is confirmed by the 
Will's reference to a non-existence power of appointment and reference to the trust wliich contained 
language therein which self-terminated itself prior to the execution of the Will. That is, a malpractice 
plaintiff who is a named beneficiary should not be prevented from utilizing extrinsic evidence, i.e., the 
existence. of a recently terminated trust, to demonstrate how the testator's intent was "frustrated". Id,  
140 Idaho at 138. 
Amlication of Harrizfeld v. Hancock: This case requires an extrapolation of the Court's 
holding in I-Iarrideld v. Ifancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), i.e., "that an attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such 
instruments . . . so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary 
instruments". Id. 140 Idaho at 138,90 P.3d at 888. Is it sufficient for an attorney to write a document 
that apparently disposes of the testator's property in apparently clear terms, leaving it to the client to 
evaluate the document to determine whether it will really accoinplish his wishes? By implication, the 
district conrt answered this question in the affirmative. Or is the attorney required to write a document 
that actually accomplishes what the document purports to say? Not surprisingly, the answer, as 
discussed more fully below, is that "it depends". 
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In this case, the testator expressed the wish that the plaintiff to this action take property held 
in trust: "All beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath and devise to Mary Killings 
(sic). I exercise any powers of appointment that I might hold and appoint Mary Killings (sic)." The 
problem is that the referenced "beneficial interests" which had been held in trust for the testator's 
benefit were owned "outright" by the testator at the time the Will was executed (R. pp. 142, 143; pp. 
95-97; A.R. p. 6). The probate court ruled that, absent the existence of any trusts, the plaintiff took 
nothing by the Will. (A.R. p. 12). 
Because ofthe Will's proper attestation and the testator's unchallenged competency, the district 
court ruled that "it is presumed that Will was as he wanted it to be", citing Hurrigfild v. Huncock, 140 
Idaho at 138.' 'That logic leads to the conclusion that, when a competent testator signs a will that is 
at least facially dear, the testator must have wanted the will to be exactly as prepared by the attorney. 
In some instances, this logic is sound. In other instances, when the testator is not able to ascertain 
whether the will would actually accomplish what he wanted, making the clarity of the document the 
sole criterion is simply wrong. 
This point is illustrated by the followirtg examples: Assunle that the testator tells the attorney 
that he wants to leave his car to his nephew and that the attorney writes a will that bequeaths testator's 
"red car" to the nephew. The testator reviews the document and executes it in an appropriate manner. 
I1 then turns out that the testator had no red car, only a black one. In this case, the attorney can 
reasonably expect the testator to know whether he has a red car and to correct the mistake. If the 
testator does not do so, it is nevertheless reasonable to enforce the document as written, because the 
i I11 this particular instance, the presumption yields the conclusion that the testator was 
playing a cruel joke by elevating plaintiff to the status of a beneficiary but, in reality, bequeathing 
her nothing. 
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issue arises from a factual detail that the testator reasonably should notice if he is paying attention to 
the will as he reads it before executing it. See Harrigfeldv. Hancock, supra; c j ,  Heinze v. Bauer, 145 
Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). Thus, it is not unreasonable to assert both that the nephew should 
take nothing pursuant to the will and that the attorney should have no responsibility to the nephew for 
the mistake. 
Contrast that case with the following example. The testator again tells the attorney that he 
wants to bequeath his sedan to his nephew, and the attorney writes a will that leaves all vehicles, as 
defined by Idaho Code Section 49-1 23(2)(c), to the nephew. The testator reviews the document and 
executes it appropriately, not realizing that the stated provision of the Idaho Code applies to 
commercial vehicles only and will not convey his sedan to the nephew. In this case, the will is clear, 
at least to a lawyer or judge, and the nephew again takes nothing pursuant to its terms. Nowever, it 
is not reasonable to assert in this case that the testator should realize that the will before him will not 
accomplish his stated intention to convey his automobile to his nephew. And, it is also unreasonable 
to assert that, in making that kind of mistake, the attorney has no responsibility for the beneficiary's 
loss simply because the will was clear to lawyers and a judge. In this example, the attorney has failed 
to prepare the testamentary document in such a way as to effect the testator's stated intention of 
transferring his vehicle to his nephew and should be subject to liability to the nephew on that account. 
In the case at bar, the testator stated that the plaintiff was to take property held in trust. It 
would be cynical and speculative to conclude that the testator actually intended, simply because he 
signed the document, to include a provision in his will that, while purporting to leave that property to 
plaintiff, really did not do so. Yet that is exactly what the district court's memorandum decision 
implies. 
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Evidence of negligence: Plaintiff has placed into evidence the affidavit of John Magnuson 
(R. pp. 126-130), opining that defendant's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care because 
he failed to study the trust doculnents referenced in the will carefully to see whether the will that he 
wrote would accomplish the testator's intent, as stated in the will, to leave the trust assets to plaintiff. 
Magnuson bases this conclusion upon two facts: (I) the Will refers to a power of appointment that was 
not granted by the trust documents and (2) the trust docunlents provide for an automatic termination 
of the trust upon the testator's fiftieth birthday. Defendant would have noticed both of these provisions 
had he reviewed the trust documentscarefully. Upon undertaking such areview, Magnuson continues, 
defendant would have ascertained whether the testator had turned fifty and would then have written 
the will in such a way as to convey to plaintiffthe property that had been held in trust. This testimony 
is undisputed. Nsvertheless, the district court disregarded it for the reasons explained above, i.e., given 
the coinpetency of the testator, proper attestation, and the clarity of the document, it is "presumed" 
that the Will tracked the intendment of the testator (R, p. 212). 
I11 so doing, the district court ignored the well established rules, cited in its own opinion, to the 
effect that plaintiff, as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, was entitled to have 
disputed facts construed in her favor and to the benefit of any inferences that might reasonably be 
drawn from those facts. G & MFarms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 5 14,808 P. 2d 851 (1991). 
Limitations im~osed bv Harri~feld: It is perhaps fair to ask at this point whether the position 
asserted by plaintiff in this appeal implicates any of the limitations imposed by Harrigfild v. Hancock, 
supra, upon the cause of action granted by that case to the beneficiaries of testamentary documents. 
First, the requirement in Harrigfeldthat the plaintiffbe named in the testamentary instrument 
as a beneficiary has been satisfied. Secondly, plaintiff's position is not dependent on the claimed 
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ornniscience of the defendant as to whom should be the objects of testator's "affection" or how the 
testator's property should be distributed. Thirdly, plaintiffs claim is not based upon the attorney's 
failure to advise her of a revoking testamentary document. Finally, plaintiffs claim is not based upon 
the bald assertion that she did not receive a perceived expectancy. Id., 140 Idaho at 138, 139,90 P.3d 
at 889. Rather, the Will bequeathed to her certain assets which two months earlier had been held in 
trust and were mis-described as trust assets in the Will. 
At most, plai~itiff's position in this case wouldonly preclude attorneys from writing provisions 
that take away with one word or phrase what they give with another, in the absence of a clear 
indication from the testator, stated in the document itself, that this is precisely what the testator intends. 
That is not at all inconsistent with Harrideld v. Hancock, supra, in which the Court expressly noted 
that imposing a duty on the part of the attorney in favor of intended beneficiaries might prevent future 
harm by creating an incentive to draft testamentary documents carefully. Id., 140 Idaho at 138. Thus, 
this case is exactly the kind of case contemplated by the Court in which an attorney should be 
responsible to an intended beneficiary who fails to receive his or her intended inheritance on account 
of the negligence of the attorney. In holding otherwise, the district court erred. 
For all ofthese reasons, this court should reverse the summary judgment entered by the district 
court. 
IT. THE DISTRICT COURT RULED IN CONTRAVENTION OF 
THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED ON IT BY RULE 56(C), I.R.C.P. 
The district court opined: "The facts do not establish a genuine dispute that the preparation of 
the Will was negligent such that the instrument was invalid". (R. pp. 212,213). First, as noted above, 
plaintiff is not contending that defendant's negligence resulted in an "invalid" will. Rather, plaintiff 
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asserts that the defendant co~nmitted error by referencing a non-existencc trust in the Will which was 
facially unambiguous and construed as such. Secondly, by the testimony of plaintiffs expert, John 
Magnuson, this error fell below the applicable standard of care, i.e., it was negligent (R. pp. 126-1 30). 
Third!y, Magnuson's affidavit creates agenuine issuc of material fact as to the existence of negligence, 
and sunxinary adjudication is not appropriate. Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346,353, 
179 P.3d 309,316 (2008); Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. 
As noted by one treatise: "If the attorney is charged with an error regarding a legal question, 
there are two issues to be resolved. First did the attorney err? Second, if so, was the error caused by 
the attorney's negligence. The first issue is one of law; the second issue is one of fact". 
Legal Malpractice 2007 Edition (Thomsen West) Vol. 4, sec. 33.12, p. 1081 
If the district court's opinion is read as finding no attorney error as opposed to the finding of 
110 negligence, this is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free review. However, the 
district court finessed the issue of whether reference to non-existent trusts was attorney error; rather, 
the cou11 entered into the province of the trier of fact by finding no negligence. 
111. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
No commercial o r  contractual relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant: 
Plaintiff's status in this matter is as a nained beneficiary in the Will of Zachary Cowan. She never had 
an attorneylrelationship with the defendant Fletcher. The duty owed to plaintiff Soignier arose out of 
the common law as articulated in Harrigfeldv. ITancock, not out of an attorneyiclient relationship with 
defendant: 
Considering these factors we hold that an attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 15 
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the 
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's 
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. 
Harrideld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138,90 P.3d 884 (2004). 
This duty was identified by the district court in its Memorandum Decision (p. 7). R. p. 21 1. 
Because plaintiff and defendant never entered into a contract or commercial transaction, Idaho 
Code 512-1 20(3) simply does not apply to this case: "In any civil action to recover on a . . . contract 
. . and in any comn~ercial transaction . . . the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." The statute requires that there 
be a contract or commercial transaction. Cily ofMcCall v. Buxton, supra. In this case there were no 
dealings whatsoever between the parties, commercial or otherwise. 
Plaintiffs "civil action" against defendant is based upon the common law duty articulated in 
ITavideld, not upon a "contract" or upon a "commercial transaction". Accordingly, defendant, even 
thouglt the prevailing party at the district court level, had no entitlement to attorney fees in this action. 
Because the underlvin~ matter was a probate matter, there is no commercial transaction 
to su~port  an award of fees under Idaho Code & 12-120(31 Cily ofMcCall v. Buxton, supua, 
overruled Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), in which the court stated: 
We now hold that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and 
even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the 
malpractice was a "commercial transaction", attorney fees under 12- 
120(3) are not authorized. 
Id. 1 19 Idaho at 425. 
CiQ ofMcCall v. Buxton, supra, does not hold that all actions for legal malpractice qualify 
as actions to enforce a "commercial transaction". Instead, it holds that: "It [I.C. 5 12- 120(3)] mandates 
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the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party 'in any commercial transaction'." 
Id., 146 Idaho at 665. That is a far cry from stating that every time someone hires an attorney, he has 
entered into a commercial transaction. 
In Cify of McCall v. Buxton, supra, the underlying transaction was a construction contract 
between the City and a general contractor, which was "commercial" in nature from its very outset. The 
allegedly negligent advice at issue in that lawsuit, i.e., to terminate the general contractor, therefore 
was given in the context of a commercial matter. Likewise, in Fuller v. Wolters, now overruled, the 
clients hired the attorney to represent them in a lawsuit arising from the purchase and sale of farm 
equipment, clearly a commercial matter. Id., 119 Idaho at 418. 
In the case at bench, the underlying transaction was the drafting of a will, clearly not a 
commercial matter. Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) excepts "personal or household" transactions from the 
scope of the statute. 
In Brower v. E.I. DuPont de Newmours and Co., 1 17 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345 (1990), Idaho's 
Supreme Court made clear that Section 12-120(3) applies only when the essence of plaintiffs claim 
is commercial in nature: 
These cases [dealing with section 12-120(3)] lead to the conclusion that 
the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial 
transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is 
whether the comlnercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. 9 12-120(3) 
unless the comn~ercial transaction is integral to the claim, and 
constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. To 
hold otherwise would he to convert the award of attorney's fees from 
an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter 
of right in virtually every lawsuit filed. (bracketed material explanatory) 
117 Idaho at 784, partially quoted in Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728. 
In AG Services ofAmerica v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62,44 P.3d 11 17 (2002) 
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The stritute [section 12-120(3)] does not authorize the awarding of 
attorney fees every time a colnmercial transaction is connected with the 
case. Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420,987 P.2d 
1035 (1 999). The test is whether the commercial transaction constitutes 
the essential part of the lawsuit. (bracketed material explanatory) 
As indicated above, the transaction between the City of McCall and its attorneys was inherently 
comiuercial in nature from the beginning. That is not so in this case, where plaintiff had no 
relationship of any nature with defendant. That the testator, a third party, attempted to name plaintiff 
as a beneficiary in his will did not give rise to any commercial relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant. Even if there were such a relationship, it was hardly essential to plaintiffs claim, which 
arose under common law, not the Uniform Commercial Code. 
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in awarding attorney fees against plaintiff. 
IV. IN THE EVENT THE COURT RULES THAT THE PREVAILING PARTY IN 
THIS MALPRACTICE ACTION IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
PLAINTIFF, IF SHE PREVAILS UPON REMAND, SHOULD BE A W A R D ~ D  
FEES FOR PROSECUTING THIS APPEAL 
The prilnary issue in this appeal is the validity of the summary judgment entered by the District 
Court. If plaintiff prevails on that issue, she is the prevailing party in this appeal. Recognizing the 
possibility that the Court may decide that the district court's interpretation of City ofMcCall v. Baton, 
supra, is correct, plaintiff claims her entitlement to attorney fees in prosecuting this appeal under Idaho 
Code $12-120(3) in the event that she is determined to he the prevailing party upon remand 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should reverse the summary judgment granted by the 
district court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings. It should also, in the interest 
of assisting the district court and the parties, address the issue of the prevailing party's entitlement to 
attorney fees. Defendant has argued that the prevailing party in all legal malpractice actions is entitled 
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to attorney fees. If the Court agrees and plaintiffprevails on this appeal as well as upon remand, she 
is entitled to attorney fees in prosecuting this appeal, 
Dated this 3Oth day of April, 2010. 
A 
/ 
Attorney for PlaintifflAppellant 
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